Legal Pluralism and Normative Transfer by Hendry, J
 1 
Legal Pluralism and Normative Transfer 
Jennifer Hendry1 
 
Order from Transfer: Comparative Constitutional Design & Legal 
Culture, G. Frankenberg (ed.) (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 2013) 153-170 
 
The transfer, transplant and translation of legal norms from one locus, context 
or culture to another is a topic with which comparative legal scholars are well-
acquainted, it having been one of the issues central to the fledgling discipline 
at its inaugural Paris congress in 1900.2 Although in the intervening period it 
could be said that these concerns receded somewhat from the academic 
limelight, the past thirty years have seen a resurgence of interest, no doubt 
due to the particular questions raised by a patent increase in globalization, 
Europeanization and governance operations, as well as by the recognition, 
reconciliation and ‘decolonization’ processes occurring in many post-colonial 
societies. While legal norms have always crossed borders, be these national, 
cultural or functional ones, recent legal and social changes and developments 
have served to make the study of this transfer of law more important than ever 
before. 
It is not only issues of legal transfer that global, supranational, and 
post-colonial developments in society and society’s law have brought to the 
forefront of the debates among proponents of comparative legal studies, 
however, but also the similarly topical matter of legal pluralism. Legal 
pluralism introduces the idea of there being spaces of normativity that may or 
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may not be congruent with the recognized boundaries of specific legal orders, 
promoting a fragmentation of ‘law’ within and across jurisdictions formerly 
understood as monist or even monolithic. An increasingly popular approach, 
legal pluralism has been described as a ‘key concept in a post-modern view of 
law’,3 and has been employed in a wide variety of endeavors including, 
among others, questioning the very character of law, challenging the bias that 
saw the nation state as the sole legal source, and making sense of the 
connections and interactions that gave rise to new post-national 
constellations.4 Alongside legal transfer, legal pluralism has starred in debates 
concerning the importance of locality and context in understanding legal 
features and practices, while also – and this is certainly as a result of their 
shared history within the discipline of legal anthropology – finding themselves 
inextricably linked by their conceptual relevance to different legal orders and 
to issues of conflict, contestation and interaction in terms of law, society, 
culture and legal culture.  
Legal transfer suggests the movement of legal norms between closed 
legal or normative orders, which has often tended to concern nation state 
legal orders.5 This chapter contends that framing legal transfer in terms of 
legal pluralism introduces another dimension to this debate, namely the 
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possibility of a reciprocal interaction of normative orders occupying a new 
‘space’ that has the potential of giving rise to an newly contextualized form of 
the ‘transferred’ legal norm, detached as it is from both of its original contexts.  
It will attempt to illustrate this by focusing specifically on the normative locus 
of state-internal legal pluralism vis-à-vis post-colonial societies with 
indigenous communities.6 This selection is driven by the particular challenges 
this presents in terms of how state-internal normative borders and boundaries 
are (re)presented, consideration of which is of course key to the concept of 
legal transfer, along with how these boundaries affect interaction among and 
across normative orders. It is the selection of intra-state legal transfer as the 
focal point of the investigation that necessitates a discussion both of legal and 
normative pluralism. 
 
Ordering Pluralism 
 
This title of this section, which was appropriated from the conference that 
gave rise to this volume, tends to conjure images of luckless legal-
comparatists attempting to herd cats or undertake other equally unenviable 
tasks, for little appears to be less ‘ordered’ than legal pluralism, whether this is 
in terms of its (contested) conception or (diverse) application. Mireille Delmas-
Marty makes a similar point in her book of the same name, observing the 
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inherent contradiction of the two words and stating that, while pluralism ‘refers 
to dispersion or free movement … ordering evokes structure, even 
constraints’.7 What is being referred to here is, in essence, the tension at the 
heart of any discussion of legal unity and legal, or normative, diversity. As 
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott notes: 
‘With its associations of order, regularity, proportionality and 
equality, there is something geometric or architectonic about 
the Rule of Law – a contrast with the ‘chaos of surfaces’ and 
‘rhetorical fronts’ of postmodernity and pluralism. And yet, the 
very fact of complex trajectories and perspectives might 
suggest a reason why this structural component is needed 
more than ever … as a means of containing the chaos of the 
legal universe’.8  
 
If it is assumed that such a structural component is required, how, then, can 
the perceived benefits of formal law mentioned in this quotation be given 
effect without perpetuating violence against legal-cultural alterity? Is it even 
possible to provide legal plurality with a semblance of order or structure 
without reducing it to (a hegemonically-dictated) uniformity? In terms of the 
locus mentioned above, the intra-state or intra-systemic issues raised by the 
interaction of indigenous normative orders and institutionalized post-colonial 
State legal systems concern the idea of legal character (or what counts as 
law), and as such the discussion is arguably more accurately described as 
one of normative pluralism opposed to legal pluralism. Clarity concerning this 
distinction is essential and so, before proceeding further with this 
investigation, it is necessary to explain and justify the definitions of legal and 
normative pluralism, and the resultant conception of alternative normative 
order, that will be employed throughout this chapter. 
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Legal / Normative Pluralism: Contestation and Interaction 
 
As discussed earlier, legal pluralism has become increasingly popular since 
its genesis in 19869 and now tends to crop up in a wide range of postmodern 
approaches, many of which conceptualize both it and law very differently.10 
The potential and scope of the concept of legal pluralism lend it a malleability 
that operates as a double-edged sword: on the one hand it is flexible enough 
to be discussed from many different perspectives, while on the other it 
appears to lack any real defining contours, other than being premised upon 
contestability. While not necessarily crossing over into outright conflict, a 
plural constellation nonetheless only manifests if there are alternative paths or 
processes available within a pre-defined legal space, in contrast to the monist 
situation (or jurisdiction) which offers no such potential for selection. Issues of 
selection, or choice, of course, introduce their own considerations of authority 
and enforceability but, to leave those to one side for the moment, suffice to 
say that the presence of different normative options within the same legal 
space constitutes those circumstances generally accepted as being legally 
plural.11 Writ large, therefore, legal pluralism can be said to come into 
existence when there is a dispute, disagreement or some other form of 
contestation about the ‘law’ that applies in particular circumstances. 
Importantly for the purposes of this chapter, moreover, wherever there is 
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normative contestation there is also interaction between (or among, to bypass 
the ‘pervasive binary’12 that tends to attach itself to the discourse on 
indigeneity and, by association, intra-state legal pluralism) normative orders, 
as this is a pre-requisite of legal transfer.  
Another aspect that is interesting about this notion of contestability as 
fundamental to plurality is that, as long as legal pluralism can be defined in 
this broad sense, in essence, simply as the opposite of legal monism or 
centralism, without qualification, then contestability itself comes to represent 
the full spectrum of legally pluralist possibilities. The definition contra 
monism13 has the effect of casting the net very wide, meaning that a huge 
variety of normative orders could arguably raise a plausible claim to existing in 
circumstances of legal plurality; indeed, it could be argued that this gives rise 
to a spectrum of legal plurality, with differences in positioning across this 
spectrum being premised upon conditions of contestability that could range 
from absolute normative conflict and even non-recognition, to an altogether 
far milder form that manifests as mutual recognition and compromise. Under 
these circumstances, then, the definition of an alternative normative order 
becomes a rather straightforward exercise, for the only features that appear 
necessary for inclusion in this category are that such an order is, in fact, 
normative, and that these (constituent) norms are at variance from the 
hegemonic, usually State, legal order. In essence the definition can be 
reduced to the simple observation that there exists within a single legal space, 
                                                        
12
 This phrase is used courtesy of Mark McMillan (Melbourne Law School, University of 
Melbourne) 
13
 The fundamental basis of legal pluralism, and perhaps the sole characteristic that unifies all 
proponents, is a rejection of the ‘false ideology’ of legal centralism as recognized by John 
Griffiths, whereby ‘law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive 
of all other law, and administrated by a single set of state institutions’. See John Griffiths, 
‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ in (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 1, 3 
 7 
to use John Griffiths’ term, a situation of ‘normative heterogeneity’.14 By way 
of contrast, however, legal pluralism is a more unwieldy concept both to 
employ and rely upon. Much of the difficulty, this chapter submits, can be 
attributed to both the popularity and malleability of legal pluralism, which have 
resulted in it becoming rather stretched and ‘thin’ and, moreover, that this 
dilution has occurred in two main areas, namely its character and its 
utilization. 
This next section will investigate both of these areas: in terms of the 
former, the character or object of legal pluralism, focus will rest upon the 
distinction that can be drawn between legal and normative pluralism, while 
engagement with the latter will revolve around the emancipatory potential 
implicit to the instrumental approach adopted and the motivations 
underpinning said adoption. By separating out these two aspects of the 
concept of legal pluralism it is hoped that some further light will be shed on 
the idea of transfer – be it legal or normative – across state-internal, 
contextually-determined boundaries and normative spaces. At this juncture it 
should be noted that, while the focus of this chapter rests specifically upon 
intra-state arrangements pertaining to the interaction of State and indigenous 
normative orders, different legal spaces and arenas – supra-state, trans-state, 
inter-state, even (and perhaps controversially) non-state – offer further 
avenues for future investigation. 
 
The Object of Legal / Normative Pluralism 
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At the outset of this discussion concerning the character (object) of legal 
pluralism, it should be stated that this issue involves less consideration of the 
aspect of plurality and more that of legality. That is to say, the focus rests on 
the distinction that can be drawn between legal and normative pluralism or, 
rather, on the requirements that social norms are expected to meet in order to 
achieve the status of law within a particular jurisdiction. While different 
commentators impose different standards and set different thresholds for 
this15, Sarah Engle Merry’s famous observation is no less pertinent here than 
it was twenty-five years ago, for ‘[w]here do we stop speaking of law and find 
ourselves simply describing social life, [and] is it useful to call these forms of 
ordering law?’16  
To explain the importance of this point in terms of the overall argument 
it is necessary to revisit the categories established by the concept’s founding 
father, John Griffiths, namely weak and strong legal pluralism. The weak form 
supersedes a legally-monist form but in a rather half-hearted kind of way – 
Griffiths describes it as ‘the messy compromise [that] the ideology of legal 
centralism feels itself obliged to make with recalcitrant social reality’.17 This 
weak form, which tends to be associated both with the intra-state paradigm 
and with post-colonial societies, has three main features: first, that it always 
remains in the gift of the (hegemonic) State; second, that the State receives 
some benefit from this compromise situation; and third, that it is invariably 
envisaged as being impermanent, a temporary solution for a difficult situation, 
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which is fine in the meantime but only until a preferable alternative can be 
found.18 Griffiths actually rejects this weak form as constituting legal pluralism 
at all – indeed, he dismisses all but the strong form, his understanding of 
which is extremely broad, effectively boiling down to the idea that all self-
regulation is law. To put this notion another way, his understanding of law is 
that it is co-extant with self-regulation within the social.  
While this is an intriguing point in terms of normativity, it appears, 
however, that such a drastic move has the effect of undermining any claim to 
legality that could be raised by an alternative normative order, or rather, that it 
empties out any legal claim. Strong legal pluralism in the Griffiths sense thus 
represents what is more accurately described as normative plurality because, 
within his conceptualization, law does not require any validation such as that 
demanded by the major proponents of the liberal (statist) legal-theoretical 
enterprise, either in the form of a Kelsenian Grundnorm or Hartian rule of 
recognition.19 Weak and strong legal pluralism as conceptualized by Griffiths 
are thus differentiated by the extent to which alternative (social) norms are 
recognized by the State or not, and in terms of the latter, the degree to which 
these norms can exist at variance to those of the State without compelling it to 
act upon them in some way. The differences between Griffiths’ two 
categories, therefore, concern plurality and plurality alone, with no specific 
consideration of legality; by designating the legal as co-extant with regulation 
in the social, he appears deliberately to signify a conceptual break with 
legally-monist theoretical approaches and those predicated upon ‘state 
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consent-centred formalism’.20 This approach, by means of de-privileging the 
legal, causes the distinction between the legal and the normative to collapse.  
While innovative, it is submitted that it is this broad conception of 
strong legal pluralism that has caused it to be such a contested and 
scrutinized concept,21 which has in turn contributed to the ‘stretching’ or 
dilution mentioned above. Other subsequent proponents of legal pluralism 
have come at the issue from the opposite perspective, seeming to prefer the 
expansion of specifically legal character to include certain social norms and 
suggesting that such alternatives as, for example, soft law, social practices 
and self-regulation exist along a spectrum of legality. Indeed, this standpoint 
is often adopted in spite of the concession that forcing a legal character onto 
social norms has the effect of causing ‘violence to be done to common 
understandings’ and a loss of distinction between the law and other social 
rules, such as customs, practices and morals.22 It is submitted that these two 
perspectives – on one hand the de-privileging of the legal and, on the other, 
its extension23 – are representative of ideologically driven instrumental 
approaches to this issue, and that the standpoint adopted as to the object of 
legal pluralism is premised undeniably upon the way the concept is intended 
to be used. This utilization, or method, is the focus of the next section. 
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The Method of Legal / Normative Pluralism 
 
In terms of legal pluralism’s conceptual method, it seems rather futile to 
engage with anything other than an instrumental approach, although arguably 
the empirically grounded descriptive approach also remains an option. 
Descriptive approaches, which in disciplinary terms are perhaps more 
anthropological that jurisprudential, tend to be neutral in their assessment, 
merely intending to identify instances of normative plurality and thus 
recognizing the existence of conflicting rules in different socio-legal spaces 
without engaging with issues of resolution or action. By contrast, instrumental 
approaches employing the concept of legal or normative pluralism are 
naturally more ideological, even political in nature, with the motivation and 
aims of the theorist often apparent from the outset.  
While this variety of impetus and intention can be cited as a 
contributory factor to the increased fragmentation of the debates on legal and 
normative pluralism across a variety of loci, whereby incompatible theoretical 
applications are compared and contrasted despite being fundamentally at 
cross purposes with each other, this is actually not the main focus here. 
Rather, the more interesting point concerning instrumental approaches 
concerns the extent to which they facilitate the identification of (a certain 
degree of) emancipatory potential within the very notion of legal plurality. 
Implicit within the legal pluralist challenge24 to the state centred formalist 
conception of monist legal order is a claim to the counter-hegemonic – the 
minority, the marginalized, the indigenous, the ‘Stranger’, and the ‘Other’ – 
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which necessarily involves the rejection of the western, Westphalian, statist, 
liberal, authoritative, centralist and monist conception of law and legal order.  
There are a number of ways of conceptualizing the issues raised by a 
pluralist conception, even if the arena is restricted to that of state internal 
situations as it is in this chapter. For example, and as discussed above, John 
Griffiths’ argument is targeted at undermining the perceived hierarchy of the 
State legal order vis-à-vis alternative normative orders with the aim of 
removing State law from its elevated position in favour of a heterarchical 
constellation within a specific legal space. More concretely, and more 
recently, Keith Culver and Michael Giudice employ a legally pluralist approach 
to present their inter-institutional idea of ‘intra state legality’, which is ‘a legal 
analogue of an internal political minority – insiders who nonetheless retain 
something of their outsider status’,25 and is theorized as existing within the 
State jurisdiction. In a third example, Iris Young utilizes legally pluralist 
reasoning to argue in favour of representation rights for minority groups, 
making the claim that such groups have been oppressed and silenced in 
democratic debate, and that representation rights ensure not just a voice but 
also an ear, thus facilitating participation in the shaping of state institutions.26 
While these examples are not intended to be exhaustive it is hoped that they 
illustrate the range of challenges laid at the door of the legally monist modern 
nation State, for so long untroubled in its hegemony, unopposed within its 
borders, and untrammelled in its employment and control of its own legal 
identifiers, structures, contours and practices. These challenges not only tug 
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at the boundaries and contours of the State but also attack it at its very 
foundation, which is to say, the consensual basis upon which its power, 
authority and legitimacy are established. 
This section on legal and normative pluralism has endeavored to 
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the legal and the 
normative, to illustrate some of the possible applications of pluralist 
approaches, and to outline the extent to which these are motivated by the 
outcomes sought by the theorists employing them. At the heart of the concept, 
however, is the idea of normative contestation between and among normative 
orders within the boundaries of the nation State, normative orders which are 
in themselves bounded, whether that be on the basis of identity, community, 
nation, or participation. It is these intra-state normative borders that the next 
section will consider, with the aim of ascertaining the extent to which 
communication, interaction and transfer across these is possible. 
 
Negotiating Boundaries  
 
If it is to be posited that alternative normative spaces exist within the 
boundaries of the nation state, then subsequent boundaries or borders 
delimiting the interior and exterior of such spaces must be identifiable. ‘Space’ 
is used here in the loosest sense of the term, which is to say that it does not 
specifically correlate to a geographical, territorial or jurisdictional locus but 
rather a context or place that is constitutive of meaning, itself constituted by 
means of a boundary that separates this normative space from its 
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environment or surroundings.27 The establishment of a boundary is premised 
upon the drawing of a distinction, although this assertion of alterity remains to 
all intents and purposes a neutral one until one side is selected or ‘marked’28, 
whereby We are distinguished from Them, for example, and Them from Us. It 
is this ‘marking’ of the different spaces on each side of the border that gives 
rise to the context and thus the meaning. While this arises by means of a 
simple dichotomy, the ‘distinguishing’ and ‘marking’ of subsequent distinctions 
can result in innumerable spaces and contexts; indeed, it is the detachment of 
the notion of space from that of geography that represents the vital step here. 
This attenuation each from the other has the effect of providing for context as 
opposed to situatedness, thus allowing for overlaps and interpenetrations by 
and of these normative spaces from the perspectives of the individuals who 
operate within their context/s and boundaries.29 This section will contend that 
it is the instigation of such boundaries that serve to represent those counter-
hegemonic assertions that are facilitative of a normatively pluralist situation. 
To elucidate this point vis-à-vis the selected example of state-internal 
normative plurality and normative transfer across intra-state normative orders, 
it is necessary to look back to the genesis of those states now referred to as 
‘post-colonial’ and the circumstances that gave rise to the situation now being 
critiqued.  
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From one perspective, the originary violence of the colonial project can 
be understood in terms of an omission, which is to say that there was a 
severe lack of participation by indigenous or sub-altern actors within the 
circumstances of the foundational. The effective dismissal of indigenous 
societies by their lands’ colonizers as being insufficiently complex and 
sophisticated even to warrant recognition of their existence is well-known,30 
with the disgraceful legal fiction of terra nullius being given as the justification 
for what amounted to a barefaced land grab. A different view, however, is that 
the originary colonizing violence was the absorption of the indigenous 
normative order into that of the legally-monist colonial State. This process was 
a twofold one, combining the misconception of indigenous norms as 
(functionally) equivalent to the alien State norms and the a-contextual 
imposition of those norms on practices and relationships that were 
‘ontologically distinct’.31 Even the subsequent halfway-house arrangements 
that come under the umbrella of the ‘weak’ form of legal pluralism maintained 
and perpetuated that initial subsumption – as discussed above, this was 
nothing more than a pragmatic solution given effect by the State in order to 
remove irreducible issues of legal conflict between itself and the indigenous 
normative orders.  
Nevertheless, and in spite of colonial motivations concerning legal and 
administrative practicalities, it is submitted that this ‘weak’ step along the 
spectrum opened the door for the (re)assertion of a genuinely sub-altern 
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normative order within that alternative, newly-delimited ‘space’ of indigenous 
normativity. While this state-sanctioned practice lacked any genuine 
emancipatory character or potential, it can nonetheless be conceptualized as 
representative of a limited form of compromise between the two normative 
orders. That is not to say that recognition of the alternative normative order by 
a hegemonic one is required (or vice-versa, however unlikely); neither 
recognition nor acknowledgement are criteria of existence for either order, of 
course, but there are necessary for interaction and, importantly for the 
purposes of this investigation, for transfer. It is the boundary that is important 
here, for it is within and under these ‘borderline conditions’,32 on the margins, 
that normative transfer occurs. As Niklas Luhmann puts it, ‘boundaries do not 
mark a break in connections. […] The concept of boundaries means … that 
processes which cross boundaries … have different conditions for their 
continuance after they cross the boundaries.’33 It is to this movement or 
transfer of normative processes and/or features that the focus of this 
investigation will now turn. 
 
Distinguishing Transfer 
 
The three terms mentioned at the outset of this chapter – transfer, 
transplantation and translation34 – related as they are by the common 
etymological root of the prefix trans-, all connote a movement or ‘crossing’ 
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from one position to another. However, despite this basic definitional 
commonality encompassing one form or another of the ‘transformation 
through travel’ of legal norms,35 these terms have substantial differences in 
terms of their conceptual employment within the comparative law discussion, 
not least as ‘signifiers of different theoretical approaches and projects’.36 
While admittedly there may be a general and widespread guilt within the 
discipline in terms of becoming overly entangled with metaphors and 
semantics, the ongoing debates concerning the most fitting phrase to 
encapsulate these diverse processes of legal normative ‘movement’ at the 
very least draw attention to their complexity and variety. This volume engages 
with many of these well-known debates and so this section shall endeavor to 
avoid repeating any of these at length, short of that required for clarity; 
nevertheless, the conceptual differences between the three terms – transfer, 
transplantation and translation – do necessitate some further explanation in 
order adequately to justify the selection of transfer for employment within this 
investigation. This justification can be simply stated: not only does the concept 
of transfer has a more universal character and application that either that of 
transplant or translation but also, by incorporating a translation component 
within its process(es), it provides a more nuanced option for the purposes of 
investigating an area as complex as intra-state normative plurality. This 
conceptualization of transfer will be explored in this section by means of 
comparison with the other two, starting with transplantation. 
 
Legal Transplantation 
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 Julia Eckert, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Transfers?’ in this volume, 1  
36
 Günter Frankenberg, ‘Constitutions in Transfer’ in this volume, 2; see also Günter 
Frankenberg, ‘Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory Revisited’ (2010) 8 I-CON 566 
 18 
 
As Ralf Michaels explains earlier in this volume, the idea of ‘copy / paste’ 
intrinsic to the notion of transplantation is different from that of ‘cut / paste’, for 
the original feature remains unaffected by its recreation elsewhere,37 
regardless of whether the ‘copying’ can be viewed as a success or failure. 
Indeed, the extent to which retention of original ‘copied’ features in the newly 
established legal norm is achieved constitutes success is a question for 
another paper, although most comparative law proponents would argue that 
the processes of acceptance, reception and recontextualisation occurring 
subsequent to the ‘pasting’ necessitate some degree of alteration or 
adaptation.38 That said, the transplantation of legal norms cannot be equated 
to their translation, for transplantation has a unilateral nature.39 Whether law is 
conceptualized either as an instrument for social engineering or as a 
commodity to be sold,40 there is rather an element of ‘trumps’ to the idea of 
transplantation, a sense of victory in competition, the vanquishing of a 
inefficient or outmoded legal feature in favour of a conquering champion – a 
Law 2.0, as it were. To put this a different way: while transplantation is 
interactive, it is not mutually so, which is to say that it lacks genuine 
                                                        
37
 R. Michaels, ‘A New Look at Legal Transplants’ in this volume 
38
 In his seminal text on legal transplants, Alan Watson goes as far as to state that the ‘usual 
way of legal development’ is that of copying or ‘borrowing’ plus adaptation: Alan Watson, 
Legal Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press 1974) 7; for a 
more contemporary debate see also Pierre Legrand, ‘What ‘Legal Transplants’ and Roger 
Cotterrell, ‘Is There A Logic of Legal Transplants?’, both in D. Nelken & J. Feest (eds.) 
Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart 2001) 
39
 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the 
Transnational Legal World (Hart 2009) 63 
40
 This arguably remains the case within a marketplace or ‘law as product’ conception 
whether or not the commodity is being bought or sold, as there is no requirement that the 
‘seller’ be dominant and the ‘purchaser’ or recipient subservient. 
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reciprocity within that process of interaction.41 For the interaction between 
normative orders to be reciprocal it must by definition be bi- (or even multi-) 
lateral, a requirement that transplantation, it is submitted, falls short of. By 
way of contrast, both transfer and translation can be said to meet this 
condition, although these must also – for the moment – be distinguished as 
distinctive concepts or, perhaps more accurately, as different processes.  
 
Legal Translation 
 
Legal translation can be differentiated from transplantation and transfer by 
means of its core requirement – namely, translation entails that there be a 
translating subject situated in the space between the normative orders. The 
process of translation, by definition, requires the active and constructive input 
of a translator, this abovementioned translating subject, who operates as a 
conduit, a connection, or a mediator between two texts or spaces.42 By means 
of the process of translation, therefore, the translator becomes the de facto 
‘author’ of the new version of the legal feature, and it is this active additional 
creative aspect that separates translation, conceptually, from transplantation, 
which neither involves nor requires such a medium – that is to say, the 
position of the translating subject in the space between the ‘selling’ or 
                                                        
41
 This issue is most overt in Alan Watson’s ‘rule-emphasizing’ conceptualization of legal 
borrowing and legal transplantation, whereby law is detached from society; see Alan Watson, 
supra note 38  
42
 This is not to say that the task of translation is a straightforward one – on the contrary, it is 
an act of extreme complexity, as explained by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: ‘Translating 
is not simple act: it is not enough to substitute the space traversed for the movement; a series 
of rich and complex operations is necessary […]. Neither is translating a secondary act. It is 
an operation that undoubtedly consists in subjugating, overcoding, metricizing smooth space, 
in neutralising it, but also in giving it a milieu of propagation, extension, refraction, renewal, 
and impulse without which it would perhaps die of its own accord: like a mask with a which 
could neither breathe nor find a general form of expression.’ See Gilles Deleuze & Felix 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Continuum 1987) 486 
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‘sending’ and ‘purchasing’ or ‘receiving’ normative orders means that the two 
processes are markedly different to what they would have been were such 
features merely transplanted from donor to recipient. The vital point here to 
note is the idea of an ‘in-between space’, as it were, a liminal or third space43, 
separate from either context A or context B, for it is here that the translator 
must necessarily be situated.  
In terms of understanding these various forms of interaction between 
normative orders, the language of systems theory might be useful here, for 
through this it is possible to separate out the component parts of the 
interaction or communication.44 Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems 
utilizes communications as its systemic elements and presents these as a 
synthesis of three aspects, namely information, message and 
understanding45, which may of course be an inaccurate understanding or 
even misunderstanding. By separating out these aspects, Luhmann serves to 
neutralize the central component, the message, decontextualizing it from its 
original setting and/or function and thus facilitating its understanding – in the 
form of its receipt, interpretation and recontextualization – within an alternative 
system. Leaving aside for the moment the questionable neutrality of the 
feature in and of itself, it is arguably possible to observe equivalences 
between this systems-theoretical conception of communication and the 
processes of transplantation and transfer. This does not, however, hold true 
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 H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge 1994) 
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 Communication in this sense is between social systems, of course, and not normative 
orders – this point is intended more as explanation of a particular construction instead of a 
genuine application of systems theory. 
45
 ‘Information, Mitteilung, Verstehen’; see Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford UP 
1995) 
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for the process of translation, which is specifically facilitated by a translator or 
translating subject within a liminal space. 
 
Legal Transfer 
 
The aspect that distinguishes transfer from transplantation, therefore, is the 
additional ‘step’ of translation inherent to it. More nuanced and sensitive than 
transplantation, more dynamic than mere translation, the concept of transfer 
has the characteristics of a process. Instead of a mere instance of movement, 
transfer rather denotes a reciprocal and interactive relationship that is 
simultaneously both place and progression – this final section will endeavor to 
explain this notion, starting with the idea of ‘place’ or, rather, ‘space’.  
It is the involvement of a translating medium within the process of 
transfer that facilitates its conceptualization not only as an interactive process 
but also a reciprocal one. Indeed, it is submitted that this has the effect of 
making the concept of transfer even more ‘ecumenical’ by liberating it from 
the binary construction of import/export and similar.46 Avoiding this ‘pervasive 
binary’, as mentioned above, is particularly important within an intra-state 
situation where the interacting normative orders are those of the State and 
indigenous peoples and societies, with their attendant power differential. It is, 
for example, this inequality in terms of the respective power-positions – the 
dominance of non-indigenous legal categories and concepts compared to the 
indigenous ones – that contributed to the criticisms encountered by Noel 
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 Günter Frankenberg, supra note 5 (2010) 570, and generally. Günter Frankenberg’s IKEA 
theory, where there is a showroom, supermarket, or ‘reservoir’ of constitutional features ready 
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Pearson and his concept of a ‘recognition space’ in respect of native title in 
Australia.47 Although admittedly his argument did not concern legal transfer or 
any other movement between normative orders or contexts, Pearson argued 
that legal recognition was constituted within an overlap between the two 
distinct fields of Aboriginal law and Australian law, to wit, native title. While 
this is an interesting idea, it generated concern about the transformative 
potential of recognition and thus the effects of State law recognition of and 
upon indigenous norms,48 in spite of arguments that this transformation was a 
two-way process and would lead to the indigenous norms also having an 
effect upon the non-indigenous Australian common law. Instead of arguing for 
a recognition space that remains within or, at least, bonded to each of these 
separate normative orders and contexts, therefore, this chapter proposes an 
interactive and reciprocal space, discrete from both (or all) original contexts. 
This in-between space is delimited by boundaries but negatively so – it is 
neither the marked nor the unmarked space but rather something and 
somewhere different. This translating space, as it were, introduces a more 
interactive aspect to the concept of normative transfer, and this exists in 
addition to that of ‘progression’ or ‘movement’ across boundaries.  
These boundaries, of course, exist between and among intra-state 
alternative normative orders, and thus generate a situation of normative 
plurality replete with issues of contestation and interaction. While the 
translation ‘step’ inherent to the process of transfer creates a new liminal 
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space, the ‘movement’ aspect of transfer itself generates those circumstances 
necessary for that space to become productive. This may not, on the face of 
it, seem to be a particularly substantial conceptual gain; nevertheless it is 
proposed that focusing not only on the outcomes of a process of transfer but 
also on the circumstances leading to such a process taking place provides 
additional insight – to make use once more of the terminology of the 
‘marketplace’, what if it is not only the norm on the shelf that is worthy of 
attention but also the reciprocal and respective behaviors of the buyer and 
seller? Recognising this dual-aspect process of transfer is, consequently, 
more important than ever in circumstances of normative plurality, particularly 
where there is a power-differential asymmetry. 
 
 
 
